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Abstract
The ‘‘Swine flu’’ pandemic of 2009 caused world-wide infections and deaths. Early efforts to understand its rate of spread
were used to predict the probable future number of cases, but by the end of 2009 it was clear that these predictions had
substantially overestimated the pandemic’s eventual impact. In England, the Health Protection Agency made
announcements of the number of cases of disease, which turned out to be surprisingly low for an influenza pandemic.
The agency also carried out a serological survey half-way through the English epidemic. In this study, we use a mathematical
model to reconcile early estimates of the rate of spread of infection, weekly data on the number of cases in the 2009
epidemic in England and the serological status of the English population at the end of the first pandemic wave. Our results
reveal that if there are around 19 infections (i.e., seroconverters) for every reported case then the three data-sets are entirely
consistent with each other. We go on to discuss when in the epidemic such a high ratio of seroconverters to cases of disease
might have been detected, either through patterns in the case reports or through even earlier serological surveys.
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Introduction
In the spring of 2009 an influenza pandemic arose in North
America. The first ‘Swine flu’ influenza A(H1N1) cases were
recorded in March 2009 in Mexico [1]. Infection soon became a
global phenomenon: the first laboratory confirmed cases in the
UK were on 27 April [2], and by the end of May more than 50
countries had confirmed cases. The World Health Organisation
formally declared the outbreak a pandemic on 11 June 2009 [3].
As the pandemic spread around the world it was natural to ask
‘‘how bad will it be?’’, and attempts to forecast epidemic impacts
were rapidly assembled, broadcast and then published. Several of
these studies focused on estimating the new influenza’s basic
reproductive number R0, defined as the number of secondary
cases caused by each case as an epidemic spreads into a population
with no pre-existing immunity [4]. A related parameter, the
effective reproductive number, Reff, pertains when an epidemic
spreads in a population in which some proportion are already
immune [5].
Estimates of the basic reproductive number ranged from 1:2 to
2:1 (see Table 1). A mid-range estimate of 1:5 implied that the
epidemic would grow until 1=3 of the population were infected or
immune, then turnover and come to an end when around 60% of
the population were immune. If all infections lead to illness prior
to the acquisition of immunity this implied that a very large
fraction of the population would become ill during the pandemic’s
early waves. Some alarming predictions were indeed made,
particularly for the UK.
In England, the Health Protection Agency (HPA) monitored
case estimates over the whole period of the pandemic, and
published its findings online in its ‘Weekly Pandemic Flu Media
Updates’ and its ‘Weekly National Influenza Reports’ [2,6]. The
last pandemic flu media update was published on 14 January
2010, the official end of the pandemic in England [2,6]. By this
time HPA’s estimates totalled 910,000 cases over the course of the
pandemic in England [2]. This amounts to less than 2% of the
English population [7], a much lower figure than expected even
with a basic reproductive number from the lower end of the
published estimates.
This large discrepancy between the predicted and observed
epidemics could have several causes. The basic reproductive
number might have been very much smaller than estimated, a
large part of the population might have been immune before the
pandemic arrived, or many susceptible individuals might have
been infected and become immune without being ill enough to
register in the case estimates.
In what follows we use simple mathematical models to
reproduce the HPA case estimates and try to learn how each of
these three factors contributed to the surprisingly small epidemic.
We then ask at what point in time during 2009 it should have
become apparent that the English epidemic would be so small.
Methods
Phases of the Epidemic
We use the HPA case estimates which were made available to
the public via the internet [2] as a data source for estimated
numbers of symptomatic cases with influenza A(H1N1) in
England. On 27 April 2009, the HPA announced the first
laboratory confirmed infected case in the UK. It updated the
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basis until 2 July 2009 when it switched to weekly updates of
estimated numbers of new cases in the previous week. The last
pandemic media update was published on 14 January 2010, when
the influenza epidemic in England was officially declared to be
over [6].
HPA’s case estimates were an estimate of the number of people
with symptomatic infections. The number of cases was estimated as
the product of four factors: the number of GP visits with influenza-
like-illness,theproportionofdiagnosedcasesthat wereconfirmedas
infected with A(H1N1), the proportion of symptomatic cases likely
to contact the health services and the likely impact of the National
Pandemic Flu Service when it became available [8,9].
The data fall into three distinct phases:
Phase I: The first phase is the initial growth phase. It
starts in week 19 with the first infected cases in the UK,
and ends in week 30. From week 19 to week 27, the
HPA released case reports based on laboratory con-
firmed cases. It changed its method to estimate cases
using surveillance measurements in week 28 [2],
explaining the jump in new cases between week 27
and 28. However, we expect that the laboratory
confirmed case numbers released before week 28 are
under-estimates of actual case numbers, because of
limited laboratory facilities and the time delay to test for
influenza A(H1N1).
Phase II: From week 30 to week 36 the number of
cases declined. This is the period of school summer
holidays in England. State schools were closed from 22
July to 3 September 2009 [10], exactly corresponding to
phase II and marking the borders of the three phases. It
is very likely that school closures during the summer
break caused the decline in transmission events as
children and young adults have been identified as the
main age groups that were infected (see Figure 1 and
[11,12]). Most universities were also shut during this
phase, reducing mixing amongst young adults.
Phase III: The last phase is the second epidemic wave
after the school holiday. Schools reopened in week 36,
and the number of new infections increased until week
44 after which numbers of new cases decreased again.
The third phase ends in week 1 of 2010 with no more
published HPA updates on estimated A(H1N1) cases.
Figure 1. HPA case data and cumulative number of cases. The bars show the number of estimated new cases per week. The cumulative
number of cases per week is presented as black line on a separate axis. The plot is separated into three phases, I–III, divided by dashed lines in week
30 and 36 between which state schools in England were closed [10]. Phase I is the initial growth phase before 22 July 2009, phase II is the school
holiday phase until 3 September 2009, and at this date phase III with another growth and decline begins.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030223.g001
Table 1. Reproductive numbers estimates for influenza
A(H1N1) from several independent studies.
Reproductive number estimates
1:22–1:58 (CI: 1:05–2:04)[ 1 ]
1:3–1:7 [17]
1:21–1:35 [18]
1:75 (CI: 1:64–1:88) [19]
1:37 (CI: 1:21–1:41){ [20]
1:6 (CI: 1:5–1:8){ [21]
1:78–2:07 (CI: 1:67–2:22) [22]
1:44 (CI: 1:36–1:51){ [23]
1:31 (CI: 1:25–1:38) [24]
A range of possible reproductive numbers is presented when multiple
estimations were made. Estimates marked with { are the effective reproductive
number Reff, while unmarked ones are the basic reproductive number R0.T h e
confidence interval (CI) is given wherever possible.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030223.t001
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We developed a simple version of the SIR mathematical model
that allows for two routes to immunity; one with disease and one
without. As we are interested in short-term epidemic behaviour it
is a model for a closed population without any births. There are
four types of individual: susceptibles, S, catch the infection at a
rate that is proportional to the fraction of the population that is
infectious. Upon infection they become infectious, either with
symptoms, Is, or without, Ia. The proportion that develop
symptoms on infection is p. After a period of infectiousness they
recover to their respective immune class, Rs or Ra. The rate of
transmission of infection from those infected to the susceptibles is
reduced by some fixed factor rh during phase II, the school
holidays. At the start of the epidemic in England most people are
susceptible so in class S, but some may already be immune so are
already in class R~RszRa. This model has five parameters:
the proportion initially immune, R(t~0)=(R(t~0)zS(t~0)), the
transmission rate, b, the reduction in transmission during
the holidays, rh, the duration of infectiousness, 1=c, and
the proportion of the population who become symptomatic if
infected, p:
dS
dt
~{rh(t)b IszIa ðÞ
S
N
dIs
dt
~pr h(t)b IszIa ðÞ
S
N
{cIs
dIa
dt
~ 1{p ðÞ rh(t)b IszIa ðÞ
S
N
{cIa
dRs
dt
~cIs
dRa
dt
~cIa
N ~SzIszIazRszRa
ð1Þ
where the reduction in transmission is a time dependent function:
rh(t)~
rh if within school holiday
1 otherwise

ð2Þ
Furthermore, the basic reproductive number can be defined as
R0~b=c, and the effective reproductive number is just
Reff~R0 S=N. In the special case p~rh~1 our model reduces
to the standard, textbook epidemiological model called the ‘‘SIR
model’’ [4].
Serological Data
We used serological data based on samples drawn in England
between July and September 2009. These were published in 2010
[11]. Table S1 shows the reported serological data and the
demographic data that we used to calculate numbers immune
before and after the first wave of the pandemic. The original
report of the serological data split England into two areas, one with
a high risk of seroconversion and one with a low risk. For our
purposes we combine these using population data of the English
population from the Office of National Statistics [7]. This yields
estimates of the proportion of the population immune before the
pandemic arrived and the proportion immune at the end of the
first wave of the pandemic. The simple model that we use to
understand these data is age-independent, and we therefore need
to calculate proportions of the total population immune without
age-stratification. To do that from age-stratified data we used
demographic data on the current age and regional distribution [7].
Qualitative Analysis
Our Method proceeds in four steps:
First we calculate how many people were immune to
A(H1N1) before the pandemic and in September 2009.
The difference between these two numbers yields the
total number of people who were infected during the
English epidemic up to the time of sampling. This is a
conservative estimate as people might have been
infected between their sampling, which started in mid-
July, and September 2009. Our method therefore
underestimates the actual number of infected cases.
Second we compare the number of seroconverters with
the cumulative number of estimated symptomatic cases
by the beginning of September to get an estimate of the
proportion of all infections that manifest themselves in
disease (parameter p in the mathematical model). This
parameter is calculated as a central value with upper
and lower confidence bounds.
We then use these two pieces of information (proportion
immune before the pandemic arrived and proportion of all
infections manifesting as reported cases) and fit our model to the
case report data. In fitting the model to the data we infer values for
the three free model parameters: the basic reproductive number
(R0), the infectious period (1=c) and the reduction in transmission
during the summer holidays (rh).
In a fourth step we use our model to ask if it could have been
obvious from case-reports alone that the English epidemic would
be so small, and if so, when. If we assume S=N&const:, the
number of symptomatic infected can be expressed through an
exponential growth:
Is(t)&I0 e
pReff {c

t
ð3Þ
The HPA data on symptomatic cases is based on weekly updates.
This weekly sampling rate might be too broad to estimate the
correct number of symptomatic cases at any time point, especially
if the generation time is smaller than a week. But it allows us to
evaluate the accumulated sum of symptomatic cases (new
infections plus recovered ones), which grows with:
Is(t)zRs(t)&
bI0
Reff{c
e
pReff {c

t
zconst: ð4Þ
where the last term expresses the normalisation constant. As
before, the growth is described with an exponential function. We
can determine the effect of the depletion of susceptible hosts, or in
other words the difference in S=N between the two waves, by
taking the natural logarithm of the accumulated sum of HPA’s
estimates. The slope of the logarithmic growth periods is (pR eff -
c), so differences in the slope of the two epidemic waves reflect the
drop in Reff caused by a depletion of susceptible hosts from one
wave to the next.
Results
The English epidemic unfolded in three phases (Figure 1). The
first phase of rapid growth was followed by a second phase when
the number of cases fell as schools closed for the summer holiday.
The third phase saw the start of the second wave as schools
reopened in the autumn. After a short period of exponential
Impact of 2009 Influenza Pandemic in England
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30223Figure 2. Comparison of serological data by age group. The number of individuals in each age group is shown with large, grey bars. Red bars
show the number of individuals immune before the pandemic. Blue bars represent numbers who seroconverted between April and September 2009.
Green bars show the number immune by early September 2009. All numbers are calculated using serological data and demographic data from
England (see Table S1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030223.g002
Figure 3. Comparison of HPA case estimates with theoretical predictions of new cases. The HPA case estimates per week are represented
in a bar plot. The model in equation (1) was fitted to these data with state variable Is representing reported cases. The initial conditions were set at
the observed value of 12:7% of the population immune before week 22. Four different values of parameter p were assumed corresponding to four
different fits: 1=p~1 - brown line, 1=p~1:81 - green line, 1=p~6:62 - blue line and 1=p~18:62 - red line. The figure illustrates that 1=p~18:62 gives
the best agreement between model and data with the smallest least square error, and allows our model to reproduce the case estimates. The fitting
procedure yields estimates for the model’s three parameters, shown in Table 2. Only when 1=p~18:62 do these parameter estimates agree with
previously published values, compare Table 2 with Tables 1, 3 and 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030223.g003
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off. This was surprisingly early, given the predicted attack rates.
These data raise four questions:
1. How transmissible was this strain of influenza amongst the
population of England (i.e. how big was R0)?
2. By how much did transmission decline during the summer
holidays (i.e. what was rh)?
3. For each case detected how many seroconverters were there
(i.e. what was p)?
4. How soon could the failure to develop into a large epidemic
have been recognised?
These questions can be addressed by combining the case report
data with serological data (Figure 2). Those serological data show
(red bars) that a substantial number of people were immune before
the epidemic arrived and that this was particularly true for those
over the age of 45. Correspondingly there were many serocon-
versions by early September (blue bars) in the young and very few
in those over 45. Finally by early September a large part of the
English population was already immune (green bars), regardless of
age.
Adding up the number of serconverters across ages gives an
estimate of 2,552,000 infections in England by the beginning of
September 2009 (range 696,000–7,186,000 based on 95%
confidence intervals for the published serological studies). Yet,
by that time, only 385,368 symptomatic cases had occurred
according to HPA case estimates. We can take the ratio of
symptomatic cases to all infections as an estimate of the proportion
of cases that are symptomatic, parameter p in our model. The
serological data imply that p~0:15 (range 0:05–0:55). This is
more easily interpreted as the inverse of p; the number for
seroconverters for each recorded case. This has a mean of 6:62
with range 1:81–18:62. In what follows we use four different values
of 1=p: 1=p~1, every seroconverter is symptomatic; 1=p~1:81,
the lower bound estimate from the serological data; 1=p~6:62,
the mean from the serological data; and 1=p~18:62, the upper
bound from the serological data.
The serological data also yield an estimate for the proportion of
the population who were immune to the pandemic influenza strain
before it arrived. The estimate is 12:7% and is used to define initial
conditions for the model in equation (1).
Having made estimates for the initial conditions and the ratio of
seroconverters to cases we proceed to fit the model to the case
data. This amounts to finding a set of parameter values that are
consistent both with the case reports and with the serological data.
Figure 3 presents the best fits of our mathematical model to the
case reports for four different values of 1=p ranging from the
situation where all seroconverters present as cases (1=p~1) to the
upper limit of estimated values in which for each reported case
there are more than 18 seroconverters (1=p~18:62) [11]. All fits
assume that 12:7% of the population are immune before the
pandemic arrives, reflecting pre-existing immunity in the popula-
tion. Our fitting procedure is to fix p to one of our four values, fix
the percentage immune before the pandemic to 12:7% and then
estimate the three parameters R0, 1=c and rh by making a least
square fit of the solution of the model (equations (1) and (2)) to the
HPA’s case report data. Table 2 reports best fit parameter
estimates for each value of 1=p. Overall, the best fit is for
1=p~18:62. The parametric fit yields R0~1:59, very much in
agreement with previous estimates (see Table 1). In addition, an
infectious period of 2:42 days lies well within previous independent
estimates for influenza A(H1N1) (see Table 3 and Table 4). The
best-estimate reduction factor, rh~0:65 reveals that transmission
is 35% lower over the period of school holidays. While there is no
empirical data to validate this result, it seems plausible as the
number of infected cases was highest in the age group of 5 to 14
years old (see Figure 2). This reconciliation of the case report data
and the serological data concludes that the 2009 English epidemic
of symptomatic cases was small for the following reasons:
1. a large fraction (12:7%) of the population were immune before
the pandemic arrived in England,
2. for every reported case there were many (approx. 18)
seroconversions that were not reported as cases so the
susceptible pool was very quickly diminished,
3. initial estimates for R0 of around 1:5 were roughly right.
Table 2. Estimated parameters using a least square fit.
Estimated parameters
1=pR 0 1=ª rh
1:00 1:16 0:18 0:98
1:81 1:18 0:28 0:97
6:62 1:27 0:82 0:89
18:62 1:59 2:42 0:65
All parameters were estimated assuming an immune fraction of 12:7% at the
beginning of the pandemic. A least square fit was used to minimise the error
between our model and HPA case estimates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030223.t002
Table 3. Infectious period estimates for influenza A(H1N1)
from two independent studies with confidence interval (CI).
Infectious period
2:5 (CI: 1:1–4:0)[ 1 9 ]
3:38 (CI: 2:06–4:69) [24]
The infectious period is presented in days.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030223.t003
Table 4. Generation time estimates for influenza A(H1N1)
from several independent studies.
Generation time
6–8 [25]
1:91 (CI: 1:30–2:71)[ 1 ]
2:6 (CI: 2:2–3:5)[ 2 6 ]
2:6–3:2 [17]
2:7 (CI: 2:0–3:5)[ 2 7 ]
2:9 [21]
1:9–2:6 (CI: 1:3–3:0) [22]
6 (CI: 5–7) [23]
The generation time is presented in days. A range of possible generation times
is shown when multiple estimations were made. The confidence interval (CI) is
given wherever possible. A median latent period of 1:4 days (CI: 1:0–1:8) [27]
and 2:62 days (CI: 2:28–3:12) [24] has been reported. The infectious period can
be estimated using the generation time as latent period and half the infectious
period are on average the generation time [4].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030223.t004
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possible to detect that there were so many seroconverters for every
reported case? Was the epidemic already starting to slow in late
July, before schools broke up? Figure 4 A answers this question
with a clear ‘‘no’’. If the schools had not broken up, using our best-
fit parameters, we believe that the epidemic would have continued
to grow rapidly for several more weeks. It is therefore not
surprising that a logarithmic plot of cumulated cases during the
weeks before schools closed (Figure 4 B) shows that the epidemic
was clearly still in its exponential growth phase with no indication
of a falling off in the growth rate. However, when schools
reconvened in September, the second pandemic wave clearly grew
at a much slower rate than before the holiday. Figure 4 C plots
cumulated case numbers in a logarithmic plot that compares the
rising phases of the first and second waves. The second wave is
clearly growing very much more slowly than the first wave, which
is consistent with the large fraction of the population that had
already seroconverted by the end of the first wave. In short, the
very slow growth of the second wave of the pandemic was a clear
indicator that many people had already seroconverted during the
first wave.
Discussion
The HPA published their case estimates on influenza A(H1N1)
infections over the period of the pandemic in England. Overall,
the HPA estimated that approximately 910,000 individuals were ill
with the pandemic influenza virus during 2009, amounting to less
than 2% of the English population [2]. This surprisingly small
number of symptomatic cases only makes sense in the light of the
HPA’s serological survey which found that around 17:7% of the
English population were already immune by the end of the first
wave of the pandemic in late September 2009. This observation,
combined with knowledge of the level of immunity prior to the
pandemics’ arrival and the dates of the English summer holidays
combine together to tell a coherent story about the 2009 influenza
pandemic in England. The pandemic had a comparatively small
impact because for every case that was reported there were around
18 seroconversions with no symptoms at all.
In retrospect, it was clear from the very slow growth of the
second epidemic wave that something was different as the known
cases up until September were too few to explains such slow
growth. Depletion of susceptibles through asymptomatic cases
would always have been a strong contender as a mechanism for
this slow observed growth.
The HPA’s serology study was organised, collected, analysed
and published in a very short space of time. No other country has,
to our knowledge, published such extensive data [13–15]. In
principle, the same pattern that was picked up in these data in
September would have been seen in samples drawn even earlier.
This modelling study is a ringing endorsement of the explanatory
power of serological surveys in a pandemic setting. However, it is
not obvious that a serological survey could have been organised
and executed any earlier in a pandemic than this one was.
The distinction between infection and disease is an early lesson
in the teaching of infectious disease biology [16]. Predictions of the
likely impact of the 2009 influenza pandemic were made using
models that did not distinguish between cases of infection and
cases of disease. A very simple model that allows asymptomatic
seroconversion is presented here and yields a coherent reconcil-
iation of the estimated numbers of disease versus the estimated
number of infections through the course of the 2009 pandemic in
England. Once it is clear how many asymptomatic cases there
were, the epidemiology of the 2009 influenza pandemic in
England makes sense.
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